

IMPACT OF CHANGING POLITICAL SCENARIO IN BANGLADESH ON INDIA-BANGLADESH RELATIONS

Agni Prakash Sharma, Assistant Professor

Department of Defence and Strategic Studies

U. P. College, Varanasi, Uttar Pradesh

Mob no- 9044023625

Dr. Satyandra Kumar, Assistant Professor

Department of Military Science

A.N.D.K. P.G. College, Babhnan, Gonda, Uttar Pradesh

Mob no- 7754053521

1.1 Abstract

This research study examines the impact of Bangladesh's political situation on its relationship with India. After gaining independence in 1971, Bangladesh underwent numerous political changes, sometimes secular, and sometimes more nationalist. It also oscillated significantly between democracy and its inherent 'political volatility.' Whatever else may be said about it, the political situation always has a direct effect on foreign policy. Bangladesh's foreign policy has a direct and significant effect on the bilateral relationship it has with its closest neighbour. The domestic political scene in Bangladesh, dominated primarily by two major parties—the Awami League (AL) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)—has complex diplomatic relations in various ways. The AL, seen as the party friendly toward India, has tried to encourage Bangladesh to offer more options and opportunities for India to be present in Bangladesh, in order to establish connections, facilitate trade, and combat terrorism. The methodology is qualitative, based on policy documents, diplomatic correspondence, scholarly articles, and media reports, to understand how ideologies of leadership and governance models affect bilateral ties. The work also addresses significant issues, including borderland infrastructure, migration, insurgency control, and environmental cooperation. Research indicates that political agreement and a mutual understanding of leadership between New Delhi and Dhaka often result in a strategic partnership and collaborative initiatives. However, if Bangladesh experiences political instability or its leadership decides to whip up anti-India sentiments, or if a third party like China or Pakistan increases its influence over Bangladesh's foreign policy, then the India-Bangladesh partnership may be at risk. This study aims to contribute to the academic and policymaking discussions on India-Bangladesh relations by identifying trends and providing strategic recommendations to ensure that these two countries maintain and strengthen their relationship, regardless of the political changes either country undergoes. The study is particularly concerned with identifying and discussing those kinds of relationship dynamics that might allow for the "diplomatic resilience" necessary for a long-term, meaningful India-Bangladesh relationship.

Keywords: India-Bangladesh Relations, Political Scenario, Regional Diplomacy, Border Security, Trade Agreements, Bilateral Cooperation, South Asia

1.2 Introduction

India and Bangladesh share deeply interwoven historical, cultural, and geopolitical ties arising from their shared colonial past and the legacy of the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War, which, with significant support from India, led to the creation of Bangladesh (Bose, 2011). Since then, the relationship has undergone several phases, characterised by varying degrees of cooperation, trust deficits, and cautious diplomacy. The domestic political scenario has often influenced the trajectory of India-Bangladesh relations, particularly

changes in leadership and policy orientation. Significant rulings by the ruling political party in Bangladesh have historically shaped its foreign policy stance. The Awami League (AL), which has historically been aligned with India's strategic interests, has promoted regional connectivity, economic collaboration, and security cooperation. During the AL's current tenure, landmark agreements such as the 2015 Land Boundary Agreement have been concluded, and interstate insurgency cooperation along the northeastern border has been remarkably strengthened (Pattanaik, 2016). On the other hand, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), which has at times adopted a more nationalistic and Islamic orientation, has been perceived as less favourable to India, resulting in diplomatic slowdowns and contentious rhetoric during the BNP's time in power. When the BNP has been in control, interstate dialogues on several issues have progressed at a snail's pace, including river water sharing, border management, and trade balancing. Meanwhile, the cooperation between the Border Security Force (BSF) and the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) has sometimes been contentious enough to suggest that it ought to be in a courtroom (Riaz, 2013). The political landscape in Dhaka has also affected the (non) fulfilment of a somewhat tantalising set of promises related to river water sharing, border management, and trade balancing (Riaz, 2013). Badminton matches and hockey matches (of the fielding variety) do not make for a good relationship talk and diplomacy do.

1.3 Objectives:

1. To study the changes in the politics of Bangladesh since 2000 and how these changes have impacted the making of its foreign policy.
2. To analyze how shifts in Bangladesh's politics affect India-Bangladesh trade, security, and border relations.
3. To analyze India's diplomatic and strategic responses to these political developments.
4. To present proposals for improving mutually beneficial relations between the two countries in the light of recent changes in the political situation.

1.4 Literature Review:

Rahman, M. (2013). In his study, Rahman investigates the Awami League's (AL) role in enhancing Indo-Bangladesh ties. He underscores, first and foremost, that the Awami League is a party known for its pro-India foreign policy. Second, Rahman elucidates that the AL is a party with a pro-India foreign policy and a clear vision for the sort of dealings it wishes to have with India. Third, he notes that it is a party with a broad agenda, ranging from regional connectivity to cross-border cooperation.

Chakrabarti, S. (2015). Chakrabarti examines India's foreign policy towards South Asia, with a particular emphasis on the strategic geographic location of Bangladesh. He highlights how Bangladesh serves as a crucial transit hub for the northeastern states of India, as well as for regional trade, security, and connectivity projects. He maintains that the stability and political orientation of Bangladesh are crucial to India's engagement strategy in South Asia and makes the case that developments in Dhaka are central to India's neighbourhood diplomacy.

Ahmed, I. (2017). Ongoing concerns in India-Bangladesh relations, such as border security, impact the lives of poor people on both sides of the border. How leadership in either country handles such persistent issues has consequences that directly impact it. In his study, B. A. Ahmed makes a compelling case for examining bilateral relations over time, recognising trends that provide insight into why cooperation occurs or why it does not. He introduces the concept of "bilateral maturity," which describes a relationship where both countries address persistent problems expertly, leading to regional peace and prosperity.

Mitra, S. (2018). Mitra studies the BNP-run governments in Bangladesh and their effect on relations with India. His work links anti-India talk from the BNP with a lack of trust between the two countries. Too much talk from the BNP makes India nervous, and not enough talk

about what India dislikes makes India even more nervous. Mitra's work suggests that the BNP is using nationalism and political rivalry with the Awami League to distract everyone in Bangladesh from real problems and to keep itself in power. Mitra is not impartial. He is very much in favour of India. However, as I suggested in my previous post, his work can serve as a counterpoint to the idea that everything is fine between India and Bangladesh.

Baruah, A. (2020). Baruah assesses the growing tendrils of Chinese influence in Bangladesh's economic and strategic affairs, especially in politically unsettled times. He believes China is investing heavily in Bangladesh and may, in time, gain unprecedented diplomatic and military leverage there. This could remake the neighbourhood, giving China access to the eastern flank of India. It might also compel India to accelerate its strategic investments along its eastern rim—in Bangladesh, Myanmar, and the Andaman Sea—further intensifying the competition between China and India for influence in South Asia.

Hossain, R. (2022). Hossain highlights the growing influence of youth and civil society movements in shaping Bangladesh's foreign policy. His research shows that the narrative public, which now has more avenues to express itself, thanks to social media, can and does affect the decisions of the country's political leaders. Even as those leaders may try to reset the agenda, the youth and civil society can raise new issues as part of the ongoing public conversation. Furthermore, in Hossain's telling, it is the Bangladeshi narrative public that is now very much in the game of foreign policy formation.

1.5 Political Changes in Bangladesh

Since 2000, Bangladesh's political landscape has undergone frequent changes, marked by the rise and fall of power and intense rivalry between the two dominant parties: the Awami League (AL) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). These transitions—and the ideological polarisation that lies at their root—have profoundly influenced both the domestic policies and the foreign policy orientation of the Bangladesh government, especially its relations with India.

The Awami League, renowned for its secular stance and historical association with India dating back to the 1971 Liberation War, has consistently adopted a collaborative approach to dealing with New Delhi. Under the leadership of Sheikh Hasina, the AL has put its signature on a range of bilateral pacts with India, addressing issues such as border demarcation, water-sharing arrangements, power trading, and counter-terrorism (Yasmin, 2020). The political stability that the AL provides has also enabled several large-scale infrastructure projects to transition from the drawing board to the real world, as well as facilitated regional connectivity initiatives, such as the BBIN Motor Vehicle Agreement (Ghosh, 2018).

Conversely, the BNP, which sees itself as a nationalist alternative, has frequently adopted an anti-India stance, especially during election campaigns. When in power, BNP-led administrations have not been particularly keen on bilateral collaboration, especially on sensitive matters such as the Teesta River water-sharing agreement and illegal immigration (Dey, 2017). Alliances with Islamist groups have further complicated and strained Indo-Bangladesh relations, leading to stalled negotiations and border security problems (Sikder, 2015).

American Institute for Bangladesh Affairs. 2019. Democratic Backsliding in Bangladesh. Washington, DC: American Institute for Bangladesh Affairs. Furthermore, the expanding impact of non-governmental actors—chiefly China—has added more layers to an already complex strategic scenario. Both major parties have, in recent years, increasingly turned to Beijing as a source of funding for infrastructure projects and military assistance, in part to counterbalance India's growing influence in the region. This foreign policy, in both its directional and undirected aspects, primarily emerges from the domestic political ideologies of the two parties.

Mass mobilisations and a party-centred governance style mould the political culture of Bangladesh. The recurrence of political violence, frequent hartals, and confrontational legislative behaviour amounts to a form of institutionalised political dysfunction that renders the direction of foreign policy anything but consistent (Begum, 2016). Moreover, when it comes to India, the long-term planning required to make a two-way relationship pay dividends is disrupted by short-term political changes. National elections in Bangladesh frequently serve as an inflexion point in the country's foreign relations. Election campaigning tends to portray India in either a favourable light, calling it a development partner, or a less favourable one, depicting it as a hegemonic neighbour, depending on the framing party's position and electoral strategy. In this way, political transitions in Bangladesh signal events in the country's bilateral engagement with India. Essential for India is to comprehend these shifts so that it can adopt a calibrated approach in dealing with the several successive governments in Dhaka. It is crucial for stable and constructive relations that India aligns its diplomatic strategies with the prevailing political realities on the ground in Bangladesh.

1.6 Impact on Trade and Security

Over the last two decades, trade and security cooperation between India and Bangladesh have evolved in a continuous and largely positive direction. Political stability in Dhaka, especially under regimes friendly to India, like that of the Awami League (AL), has meant that significant advances can be made—covering everything from security collaboration (cooperation to stop terrorism in the border areas) to trade (improve infrastructure and connectivity across the border, which has too often meant border firing, bad for trade and bad for human rights, as well as the economic integration of the two countries).

One of the most noticeable results of political goodwill is the construction of infrastructure that crosses national borders. An example of such an undertaking is the Akhaura-Agartala rail link project. Launched to enhance the efficiency of people-to-people contact and the movement of goods, this relatively modest rail connection reflects a mutual interest in regional connectivity. Such projects are often negotiated and laid down during “honeymoons” in the diplomatic relationship between the two governments concerned. Invariably, they are presented to the public as evidence of the fruitful outcome of the employment of two key nuts in the foreign policy gadget: soft power and political goodwill. The trade relationship has grown much closer, but there is a nagging feeling within the Bangladeshi government that the terms of trade are unfair. Das (2016) reports that the Bangladeshi government frequently raises this issue in discussions with India. At a recent event (20 September 2017) hosted by the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, a senior official from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry in Bangladesh took the opportunity to complain about the terms of trade. Until Bangladesh's complaint can be handled to its satisfaction, the trade relationship may be viewed in some quarters as being somewhat unstable.

Regional peace and partnership have led to improved security cooperation under governance in Bangladesh, which prioritises friendship with India. Under the leadership of the Awami League, Bangladesh and India have worked together, much more than ever before, to put a lid on insurgency (and the resultant cross-border violence) associated with northeastern India. The insurgents, of course, tend to find safe havens in places like Bangladesh. So, in the past year (2016)—and with the Awami League now firmly in control of the political space in Bangladesh—we have seen, first, some enhanced security cooperation in northeastern India and then, second, some talks associated with that cooperation at the diplomatic level (for the sake of operational convenience and efficacy). The operational efficiency aspect is important because it means that our operational partners—Bangladesh and India—trust one another. (Trust is in short supply these days.) These meetings between

security and intelligence services associated with Bangladesh and India might, at best, be characterised as something akin to a new kind of partnership—a partner in the region that is friendly. Conversely, illegal migration, smuggling, and insurgent activity tend to rise in hostile political climates, especially when a BNP-led government is in place (Ahmed, 2015). When the Bangladeshi government is non-cooperative or too ideologically divergent from us to be effective, intelligence sharing suffers, and this is directly reflected in compromised border security.

A significant recent success in diplomacy is the Land Boundary Agreement (2015). It was accomplished during a politically cooperative era and resolved a long-standing dispute over enclaves. Better yet, it was a big Step in facilitating better border management. Who would have thought, after all, that landmark agreements are difficult to negotiate in politically fragile times when nationalists are venting much hot air? With Indian investment, economic corridors and special economic zones established in Bangladesh have created jobs, led to the construction of factories, and stimulated growth. However, such growth cannot be taken for granted. It requires something more: the political will, on both sides, to ensure progress. This point is made in a recent essay by Dr. Ehsan. Moreover, he has a good reason for making it. Security issues that straddle national borders significantly impact media representations and public sentiment, which are primarily shaped by the type of political discourse that occurs on both sides of the border. Political cooperation fosters an environment in which diplomatic channels can better serve the public by mitigating unhelpful reporting and facilitating better understanding between the two publics. The two in public can achieve this better if they are well-informed and, better yet, if they agree to keep things under control. Finally, as external powers such as China extend their reach into Bangladesh's infrastructure and defence sectors, India's strategic calculus hinges on how politically amenable Dhaka is to trilateral or multilateral cooperation. A stable government in Bangladesh that is aligned with India is less likely to tolerate excessive Chinese influence, thereby preserving the traditional Indo-Bangladeshi security architecture.

1.7 India's Diplomatic Responses:

A policy of “Neighbourhood First” has always been a mainstay for India, just as it is under Prime Minister Narendra Modi today. Maintaining stable and strong relations with its immediate neighbours is a top priority for India, and that includes Bangladesh. Under this policy, India has prioritised diplomatic outreach to these countries, and in the case of Bangladesh, has worked diligently to engage its government diplomatically. That is the first point. The second point is that India, regardless of which party has been in power, has engaged diplomatically with Bangladesh and sought to promote regional stability, which is rooted in democratic institutions in both countries.

New Delhi's diplomatic strategy has generally taken a course of pragmatic follow-up. It has demonstrated a readiness not only to engage with the deeply polarised protagonists of Bangladesh's domestic politics—the Awami League (AL) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)—but also to work with them in a Bangladesh with improved bilateral relations with India. Prashant Kumar Singh is right to call India's act of courting both parties and working with them in a three-way political alliance a difficult sell. Singh also highlights how Bangladesh's domestic politics often influence India's engagement with Bangladesh (Singh, 2021).

India's restraint in the face of Bangladesh's domestic political crises—including controversial elections and human rights concerns—forms part of a larger strategy to avoid appearing interventionist. This cautious approach helps India maintain long-term influence without direct interference in Bangladesh's sovereignty. High-level visits often signal vibrant diplomatic relations, but joint statements, where regional dynamics allow, also showcase the vibrancy of such relations. Security collaboration, particularly in the context

of counter-insurgency operations and intelligence sharing, is another key aspect of India's stellar performance in Bangladesh.

India has successfully navigated its relations with Dhaka through the recent political turmoil that has affected its neighbour. This has been partly because the ruling coalition in Bangladesh is not entirely averse for India, partly because our neighbor tends to lurch from a period of friendlier political winds to a period of not-so-friendly political winds, and partly because India's delayed-action diplomacy in dealing with the non-state actors, opposition parties, and civil society organisations in Bangladesh has been somewhat effective. It has also been helped along by the fact that India has employed this layered-diplomacy model not just as a means of better understanding the political dynamics in Bangladesh, but also as a way of ensuring political and social resilience in bolstering the bilateral relations between Dhaka and New Delhi, come what political winds may.

1.8 Policy Recommendations

To ensure future-proof and resilient relations between India and Bangladesh, particularly in light of Bangladesh's evolving political landscape, a nuanced, multi-pronged strategy must be adopted. This will require India to move beyond the not-so-different diplomatic style of the previous regime, beyond relying on the style of party-to-party diplomacy, and beyond connecting with Bangladeshi friends who are not just in power now but also with those who will be in power later. Moreover, beyond all the aforementioned methods, there needs to be a move towards building more substantial and genuinely 'people-based' connections.

First, cross-border infrastructure development must remain a priority. Projects such as the Akhaura-Agartala rail link, inland waterway projects, and trans-border electricity trade have already shown positive impacts. India should collaborate with Bangladesh on more such initiatives, for instance, the India-Bangladesh Friendship Pipeline, a natural gas conduit that would run from West Bengal to Dhaka, and the regional road corridors under the BBIN (Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal) initiative.

Second, cultural diplomacy should be used strategically to reinforce shared heritage and mutual respect. Celebrating Rabindranath Tagore, the 1971 Liberation War, and the Bengali language and literature can create deep emotional and intellectual bonds with Bangladesh. Cultural and intellectual exchanges can elevate that relationship to a higher level. India can do all this by supporting its next-door neighbour in diverse ways.

Third, India must broaden its engagement beyond the ruling party in Dhaka.

Although the Awami League remains a trusted ally, India must also cultivate relations with the other side of the political spectrum in Bangladesh, particularly the BNP. Nonpublic engagement with them could take several forms, including these:

1. Quiet diplomatic outreach to help establish trust and understanding.
2. Academic interactions to deepen knowledge and enrich conversations.
3. Think tank collaborations to broaden the spectrum of policy discussions.

These bridge-building activities could help mitigate the domestic political changes that seem inevitable in Bangladesh, making them less dramatic in terms of their impact on India.

Fourth, people-to-people connections must be strengthened. India should facilitate the visa process for students, medical patients, and skilled professionals from Bangladesh, preferably offering long-term visas. We need to find more ways to make scholarships accessible to deserving young Bangladeshis. Moreover, we should be increasing the production of student exchange programs significantly. Come to think of it, why not also allow our educational institutions to help in the medical sector? That would be a win-win.

Fifth, joint environmental and climate projects offer a non-political platform for bilateral cooperation. India and Bangladesh face similar challenges, including cyclones, that threaten the millions of people living in coastal and riverine areas throughout the two countries. However, where these two neighbours need to work together is in the river basins they

share—especially the Ganges, Brahmaputra, and Meghna River systems, which are among the most densely populated in the world.

Sixth, digital diplomacy and counter-disinformation mechanisms should be established. Social media is increasingly becoming a space where sentiment, both pro and anti, is expressed. During elections or moments of political contention, this is even more true. For a neighbouring country like Bangladesh, this aspect of the expression can directly destabilise the bilateral relationship if falsehoods or half-truths fuel the anti-India sentiment expressed during these moments. So, what to do about it? One viable option is for the Indian side to propose a suite of digital literacy programs to be held in Bangladesh. Why? Because if you are going to tackle a problem in a specific area of human expression, a good place to start is with the human beings who are expressing themselves in that area.

1.9 Conclusion

India must institutionalise bilateral cooperation through robust frameworks such as annual strategic dialogues, trade facilitation councils, and border coordination mechanisms. The bodies should not just comprise government functionaries. They should also include representatives from the private sector and civil society. This would ensure that the India-Bangladesh relationship is not just a function of top-level political dynamics, but one that has, as its foundation, a meaningful set of shared interests that spans all kinds of sectors and communities. In conclusion, India's engagement with Bangladesh needs to be layered and inclusive. The underlying policy must be anchored in mutual growth and interdependence, and in what might be called multi-stakeholder diplomacy. Bangladesh has a domestic politics that can be unstable, and this instability can arise for various reasons, including inter-party squabbles and the always volatile equation between the ruling party and the opposition. However, too much or too little can cause the engagement with Bangladesh to fall off either end of a seesaw.

References

1. Ahmed, F. (2015). *India's Strategic Patience in South Asia*. Journal of Asian Foreign Policy, 11(2), 87–103.
2. Ahmed, K. (2015). *Migration and Border Challenges in India-Bangladesh Relations*. Journal of Border Studies, 12(3), 210–229.
3. Begum, M. (2016). *Partisan Politics and Policy Instability in Bangladesh*. Dhaka University Journal of Political Science, 22(1), 34–56.
4. Baruah, A. (2020). China's Strategic Entry into Bangladesh: Implications for India. *South Asia Monitor*, Issue 158.
5. Bose, S. (2011). *Dead Reckoning: Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh War*. Columbia University Press.
6. Chakrabarti, S. (2015). India-Bangladesh Relations: Post-2014 Challenges. *South Asian Survey*, 22(2), 175–190.
7. Chowdhury, A. R. (2019). Democratic Regression and Party Dominance in Bangladesh. *Asian Affairs*, 50(3), 387–405.
8. Chowdhury, R. (2018). *Media, Politics, and Bilateral Cooperation: The Bangladesh Perspective*. Asian Journal of Political Communication, 5(2), 145–163.
9. Das, K. (2016). *Trade Imbalance Between India and Bangladesh: A Policy Review*. South Asia Economic Review, 8(1), 89–110.
10. Dey, R. (2017). India-Bangladesh Relations: Challenges of the Teesta Water Dispute. *Strategic Studies Journal*, 15(2), 97–113.
11. Dutta, P. (2016). *Cross-Border Security Cooperation: The India-Bangladesh Experience*. Strategic Studies Review, 14(1), 55–72.

12. Ehsan, M. (2020). *India's Investment in Bangladesh: Scope and Political Implications*. Journal of South Asian Studies, 29(2), 172–188.
13. Ehsan, R. (2017). *India and Bangladesh in Regional Organisations: Prospects and Pitfalls*. South Asian Affairs, 9(2), 123–139.
14. Farooq, R. (2019). *Infrastructure Diplomacy: The Case of the Akhaura-Agartala Rail Link*. Bangladesh International Affairs Review, 10(1), 60–78.
15. Ghosh, A. (2019). *Neighbourhood First and the Bangladesh Factor*. Indian Foreign Policy Digest, 6(4), 200–215.
16. Ghosh, P. (2018). *South Asian Connectivity: The BBIN Initiative and Regional Politics*. Observer Research Foundation.
17. Haider, M. (2021). *Vaccine Diplomacy and India's Role in Bangladesh*. Dhaka Global Health Review, 4(1), 44–58.
18. Hossain, R. (2022). *Youth and Civil Society Movements in Bangladesh: Diplomatic Impacts*. Journal of Democratic Studies, 13(2), 98–117.
19. Mitra, S. (2018). *Political Transition and Cross-Border Insurgency in Bangladesh*. Security Review Quarterly, 19(3), 77–92.
20. Nahar, A. (2022). *Elections and National Identity in Bangladesh*. Journal of Asian Political Studies, 31(2), 204–222.
21. Pattanaik, S. S. (2016). *India-Bangladesh Relations: Towards a Synergistic Future*. IDSA Issue Brief.
22. Rahman, M. (2013). *Awami League's India-Centric Foreign Policy Evolution*. International Journal of South Asian Affairs, 8(1), 33–49.
23. Rahman, T. (2020). *India's Silence on Bangladesh's Political Crisis: A Strategic Calculation*. South Asia Monitor, 7(3), 162–174.
24. Riaz, A. (2013). *Political Islam and Governance in Bangladesh*. Routledge.
25. Sikder, S. (2015). *Islamist Alliances in Bangladesh: Implications for India*. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies Policy Brief.
26. Singh, R. (2022). *Beyond Governments: Engaging Civil Society in India-Bangladesh Relations*. Policy Perspectives, 10(2), 65–80.
27. Sultana, S. (2017). *Counter-Insurgency and Bilateral Security: The India-Bangladesh Model*. Security Studies Quarterly, 14(3), 115–138.
28. Talukdar, B. (2018). *Water Sharing Challenges and the Teesta Deadlock*. Journal of Hydropolitics, 5(3), 110–127.
29. Varma, P. (2022). *China's Strategic Expansion in Bangladesh: Regional Consequences for India*. Strategic Vision, 18(2), 204–219.
30. Vasudevan, R. (2021). *China's Strategic Entry into Bangladesh: Implications for India*. South Asia Monitor, Issue 158.
31. Wadud, M. (2016). *The Land Boundary Agreement: A New Era in India-Bangladesh Relations*. Dhaka Policy Journal, 4(4), 33–47.
32. Yasmin, L. (2020). *Awami League's Foreign Policy: A Tilt Towards India?* Bangladesh Policy Research Forum.